Labor surplus
Every scenario in which labor surplus is a modeled driver — one risk, read across the whole library.
46 scenarios touch this risk, ranked by probability.
35%▲ 6–18 months
What if 2023-style immigration disinflation redux cools US wages (good)?
32%▲ 3–10 years
What if Alzheimer's is reversed?
31%▲ 6–18 months
What if Cooling wages clear the way for a Fed dovish pivot?
30%▲ 3–10 years
What if Korea immigration and automation offset demographic drag (good)?
29%▲ 6–18 months
What if Gulf labor-migration policy keeps construction CPI contained (good)?
28%▲ 1–3 years
What if US immigrant labor surge revives potential GDP growth (good)?
28%▲ 1–3 years
What if Pro-immigration policy reflates US prime-age participation (good)?
27%▼ 1–3 years
What if Canada immigration-cut soft landing eases housing strain (good)?
27%▲ 1–3 years
What if Germany skilled-migration reform offsets workforce decline (good)?
26%▲ 1–3 years
What if Supply-side renaissance: chips, energy and labor bottlenecks clear?
26%▲ 1–3 years
What if Automation-driven labor surplus reopens disinflation in services?
25%▼ 1–3 years
What if Reshoring stalls on labor shortages and skills gaps?
25%▲ 1–3 years
What if Wage-growth moderation supports a soft-landing margin recovery?
25%▲ 1–3 years
What if Managed climate-adaptation migration lifts inland growth hubs (good)?
25%▲ 1–3 years
What if Coordinated openness on trade and migration cools US prices (good)?
25%▲ 1–3 years
What if High-skill immigration reform supercharges US innovation (good)?
24%▲ 3–10 years
What if Longevity drug adds a decade?
23%▲ 3–10 years
What if AI-driven labor surplus forces a serious US UBI and tax debate?
23%▼ 3–10 years
What if Demographic labor-force shrinkage caps DM trend growth?
23%▲ 3–10 years
What if Pro-natal and migration policy stabilizes Europe's workforce (good)?
23%▲ 3–10 years
What if EU labor-integration pact turns migration into a growth boost (good)?
23%▲ 1–3 years
What if Streamlined health-worker visas relieve US care shortage (good)?
22%▲ 1–3 years
What if State-level work-authorization programs ease labor gaps (good)?
22%▲ 1–3 years
What if Care-worker visa pathway eases US eldercare cost pressure (good)?
20%▲ 1–3 years
What if Europe faces a new wave of mass migration?
20%▲ 6–18 months
What if Hard-landing recession: overtightening breaks the labor market?
20%▲ 1–3 years
What if Prime-age participation surge as flexible AI-enabled work expands?
20%▲ 1–3 years
What if Japan immigration shift eases chronic labor shortage (good)?
20%▲ 1–3 years
What if Returnee-driven labor revival accelerates Ukraine rebuild (good)?
20%▲ 3–10 years
What if Japan participation-and-immigration reform reflates demand (good)?
20%▲ 6–18 months
What if Expanded seasonal-visa pipeline steadies food and travel prices (good)?
20%▲ 1–3 years
What if Ag-worker legalization stabilizes US food supply chains (good)?
20%▲ 3–10 years
What if Return-migration and remote-work revive Southern-Europe regions (good)?
20%▲ 6–18 months
What if Labor-supply normalization breaks the US wage-price loop (good)?
19%▲ 1–3 years
What if cashierless stores push human cashiers below half the workforce?
18%▲ 1–3 years
What if Bipartisan immigration compromise unlocks broader reform (good)?
17%▲ 6–18 months
What if Stable processing-sector labor steadies US protein prices (good)?
15%▲ 3–10 years
What if a major economy opens its borders to win global talent?
15%▲ 1–3 years
What if Wage-deceleration disinflation: job-switching premium fades fast?
14%▲ 1–3 years
What if Wage disinflation soft landing: pay growth normalizes, jobs intact?
14%▲ 6–18 months
What if Labor-market break: layoffs cascade as the Sahm rule triggers?
13%▲ 1–3 years
What if Recession-led disinflation overshoot: slack drags inflation below 1%?
12%▲ 0–6 months
What if Payrolls miss recession scare: a weak jobs print triggers a scramble?
10%▲ 3–10 years
What if shrinking workforces structurally cut office demand in advanced economies?
9%▲ 3–10 years
What if hybrid and remote work permanently lower office demand across advanced economies?
8%▲ 1–3 years
What if euro-area unemployment rises 6 percentage points in a stagflationary downturn?